

THE RADICAL ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN WEST SUMATRA: AN EARLY INVESTIGATION AND MAPPING

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Abstract

This article focuses on the background of the emergence of radical Islamic movements in West Sumatra, the strategies and media of the movements used and the implications of radical Islamic movements for social, political and diversity life in West Sumatra. At the same time, this article also illustrates the steps of de-radicalization to strengthen diversity. This research conclusively found that the diversity of the West Sumatra indicates the roots of groups that develop radical attitudes in implementing and responding to various conditions that occur. Among these groups are FPI, MMI, and KPSI. Interestingly, the attitudes and behaviour of the radical Islamic Radicalism groups in West Sumatra received a positive response and received support from the MUI West Sumatra. Furthermore, in several universities, especially in general universities, radical attitudes were also shown by several student organizations, such as LDK, FSI, and FPI. Many strategies undertaken in the efforts to *jihad* become the focus of radical groups, namely: the movement to implement Islam law with *amar makeruf nabi mungkar*, uphold the *khilafah Islamiyah* framed in the slogan *hijrah* and *jihad*.

Keywords: Radical Islamic Movement, West Sumatra, *Hijrah*, De-Radicalization.

Abstrak

Artikel ini berfokus pada latar belakang munculnya gerakan Islam radikal di Sumatra Barat, strategi dan media gerakan yang digunakan, serta implikasi gerakan Islam radikal untuk kehidupan sosial, politik dan keragaman di Sumatra Barat. Pada saat yang sama, artikel ini juga menggambarkan langkah-langkah deradikalisasi untuk memperkuat keragaman. Penelitian ini secara meyakinkan menemukan bahwa keanekaragaman Sumatra Barat menunjukkan akar kelompok yang mengembangkan sikap radikal dalam menerapkan dan merespons berbagai kondisi yang terjadi. Di antara kelompok-kelompok ini adalah FPI, MMI, dan KPSI. Yang menarik, sikap dan perilaku kelompok Radikalisme Islam radikal di Sumatra Barat mendapat respons positif dan mendapat dukungan dari MUI Sumatra Barat. Selanjutnya, di beberapa universitas, terutama di universitas umum, sikap radikal juga ditunjukkan oleh sejumlah organisasi mahasiswa, seperti LDK dan FSI. Sejumlah strategi yang dilakukan dalam upaya *jihad* menjadi fokus kelompok radikal, yaitu: gerakan menerapkan hukum Islam dengan *amar makeruf nabi mungkar*, menegakkan *khilafah Islamiyah* yang dibingkai dalam slogan *hijrah* dan *jihad*.

Kata Kunci: Gerakan Islam Radikal. Sumatra Barat, *Hijrah*, Deradikalisasi.

Background

Since radical Islam gained momentum after the fall of the Soeharto regime (New Order), which was known as authoritarian,¹ the spirit of the radical Islamic movements grew stronger, so that, the socio-religious

conditions of the people began to be shifted. It was proven by the emergence of various Islam communities (next it will be called as mass organizations) at transnational, national and

¹Mona Abaza, 'Generasi Baru Mahasiswa Indonesia Di Al-Azhar', *Islamika*, 3 (1994), 34-47.

local scale.² They persist in voicing the Islam appearance as tightly as at the time of the Prophet. In addition, a number of new organizations of Islam appeared aggressive and able to rival Islam organizations that had been born before, such as Muhammadiyah, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Tarbiyah Islamiyah Association (Perti), Persatuan Islam (Persis), Al Washliyah, and other Islam organizations. This is in line with Syahrin Harahap statement; the radicals have an unclear characteristic of enemy construction, because they regard people who disagree with them are enemies.³

The emergence of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia has been analyzed by many scholars through various approaches. From geneological and historical aspects, some studies such as Anshori (2019)⁴, Mubarak and Hamid (2018)⁵, Temby (2010)⁶, Sirozi (2005)⁷, and Bruinessen (2002)⁸ mention that among the radical characteristics embedded in several groups in Indonesia lies in the strong

orientation of salafism (orientation to the past) and the influence of Middle Eastern scholars who are believed to be the most valid Muslim worldview. The history can be traced from the ideology of Islamic religious movements that want to realize the Islamic State or the Khilafah system in Indonesia.

Some other studies that analyze the link between the emergence of the radical Islamic movements in Indonesia with political aspects, especially after the fall of the Soeharto regime are Hasan (2018)⁹, Mudhoffir (2016)¹⁰, Jati (2013)¹¹, Heiduk (2012)¹², Fealy (2004)¹³, Jamhari (2003)¹⁴, and Riddell (2002)¹⁵.

In addition to the social, political and theological phenomenon, the radical Islamic movements are also a portrait of the failure in understanding and interpreting history accurately. This is in line with the opinion of Khaled Abou El Fadl¹⁶ and Azyumardi Azra¹⁷. In this context, the radical groups of Islam do not try to interpret history in accordance with

² Jamhari, 'Mapping Radical Islam in Indonesia', *Studia Islamika*, 10.3 (2003), 1–28 <<https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v10i3.622>>.

³ Syahrin Harahap, *Upaya Kolektif Mencegah Radikalisme Dan Terorisme* (Jakarta: PT Desindo Pura Mandiri, 2017), p. 24; see also Zulfan Taufik, 'Berebut Kuasa Rumah Tuhan: Ekspansi Ideologi Radikal Melalui Masjid Di Kota Bekasi', *Islam Realitas: Journal of Islamic & Social Studies*, 4.1 (2018), 21–38.

⁴ M. Afif Ansori, 'The Radical Islamic Movement in Indonesia: Roots and Factors', *KALAM*, 13.2 (2019), 105–24 <<https://doi.org/10.24042/klm.v13i2.5251>>.

⁵ M. Zaki Mubarak and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 'The Rise of Radicalism and Terrorism in Indonesia and Malaysia', *RISEA: Review of Islam in Southeast Asia*, 1.1 (2018), 29–43.

⁶ Quinton Temby, 'Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah', *Indonesia*, 89 (2010), 1–36.

⁷ Muhammad Sirozi, 'The Intellectual Roots of Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'far Umar Thalib of Laskar Jihad (Jihad Fighters) and His Educational Background*', *The Muslim World*, 95.1 (2005), 81–120 <<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-1913.2005.00080.x>>.

⁸ Martin van Bruinessen, 'Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *South East Asia Research*, 10.2 (2002), 117–54 <<https://doi.org/10.5367/000000002101297035>>.

⁹ Noorhaidi Hasan, 'Reformasi, Religious Diversity, and Islamic Radicalism after Suharto', *Journal*

of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, 1.1 (2018), 23–51 <<https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v1i1.2>>.

¹⁰ Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir, 'Political Islam and Religious Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia', *MASYARAKAT: Jurnal Sosiologi*, 20.1 (2016), 1–22 <<https://doi.org/10.7454/mjs.v20i1.4796>>.

¹¹ Wasisto Raharjo Jati, 'Radicalism in the Perspective of Islamic-Populism: Trajectory of Political Islam in Indonesia', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 7.2 (2013), 268–87 <<https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2013.7.2.268-287>>.

¹² Felix Heiduk, 'Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 6.1 (2012), 26–40.

¹³ Greg Fealy, 'Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?', *Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2004, 104–21.

¹⁴ Jamhari.

¹⁵ Peter G. Riddell, 'The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, 13.1 (2002), 65–84 <<https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410210210299>>.

¹⁶ Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremism* (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005), p. 131.

¹⁷ Azyumardi Azra, *Pergolakan Politik Islam Dari Fundamentalisme, Modernisme Hingga Post-Modernisme* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), p. 185.

the context of the current age, whereas, they want to restore history to its past, without giving constructive criticism. The rigidity of understanding history also contributed to the rise of radical movements. According to Robert Wuthnow, an attempt to restore history that has passed as it is with the age afterwards is called *rediscovery*¹⁸.

Religious social movements always use religious values (Islam) as the basis in expressing the struggles of a movement. Then, at the same time, the Islam organizations showed quite rapid development in several regions of Indonesia, including in West Sumatra. Of course, it will naturally cause problems for people who are not familiar or unusual to the expression of Islam. According to Ted Robert Gurr, all types of radicals are a threat that must be feared including the radicalization of communal groups of Muslims¹⁹.

Furthermore, in the context of Islamic radicalism in West Sumatra, several studies have been carried out, among others, by Abd A'la (2008)²⁰, Zainal (2014)²¹, and Rozi (2015)²². These studies see the Paderi movement as the root of the Islamic radicalism movement in West Sumatra and Indonesia. These studies also show how the emergence of the Islamic radical movement in West Sumatra has an impact on Minang diversity which has

been strongly existed in a pluralist society. The West Sumatra society, which is famous for their pluralism and mutual respect, will be threatened and replaced with an extreme understanding of textual religion as understood by radical groups of Islam. However, a critical study shown here is the response of indigenous peoples and tarekat in Minangkabau in responding to the radical Islamic movements that are developing in West Sumatra, as conducted by Sefriono and Mukhibat (2018)²³ and Azwar (2018)²⁴.

This research focuses on the phenomena of Islamic ideology and religious movements of the West Sumatra society and the background of the emergence of radical Islamic movements in West Sumatra. Additionally, it is necessary to know the radical groups of Islam that are developing in Sumatra, the strategy and media of the movement that used, the implications of the radical Islamic movement for the social, political life and diversity in West Sumatra. At the same time, it is also necessary to formulate de-radicalization steps to strengthen diversity.

The informants of this research are experts who are considered to know and understand about the radicalism movement in West Sumatra, in this case the observers and those directly involved in handling the radicalism and terrorism movement. Then, the

¹⁸Robert Wuthnow, *Rediscovering the Sacred: Perspective on Religion in Contemporary Society* (Eerdman's: Michigan, 1992), pp. 1–5.

¹⁹Ted Robert Gurr, 'Minorities, Nationalists, And Islamists: Managing Communal Conflict in The Twenty-First Century', in *Leashing the Dog of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), p. 136.

²⁰Abd A'la, 'The Genealogy of Muslim Radicalism in Indonesia: A Study of the Roots and Characteristics of the Padri Movement', *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 2.2 (2008), 267–99 <<https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2008.2.2.267-299>>.

²¹Zainal Zainal, 'Gerakan Islamis Di Sumatra Barat Pasca Orde Baru', *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman*, 38.2 (2014), 446–65 <<https://doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v38i2.103>>.

²²Syafwan Rozi, 'Dari Islam Radikal Ke Islam Pluralis: Geneologi Gerakan Paderi Dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Islam Pluralis Di Perbatasan Minangkabau', *Masyarakat Indonesia*, 41.1 (2015), 15–27 <<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.14203/jmi.v41i1.240>>.

²³Sefriono Sefriono and Mukhibat Mukhibat, 'Preventing Religious Radicalism Based on Local Wisdom: Interrelation of Tarekat, Adat, and Local Authority in Padang Pariaman, West Sumatra, Indonesia', *SOSIOHUMANIKA: Jurnal Pendidikan Sains Sosial Dan Kemanusiaan*, 11.1 (2018), 1–18 <<https://doi.org/10.2121/sosiohumanika.v11i1.999>>.

²⁴Welhendri Azwar, 'The Resistance of Local Wisdom towards Radicalism: The Study of the Tarekat Community of West Sumatra, Indonesia', *Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, 26.1 (2018), 75–102.

second informant is the chairman of the community organization which is categorized as a radical group.

The Emergence of Radical Islamic Movements in West Sumatra

In third world countries, the emergence of radicalism or fundamentalism movements is a reaction to the symptoms of Western fundamentalism that want to impose their worldview on their colonies, both subtly and through gun violence. Because of their arrogance, they want to civilize the nations that are considered weak. This is the root of various forms of colonialism political, economic, and socio-cultural.²⁵

Pre-modern of Islam fundamentalism emerged due to certain situations and conditions among Muslims themselves. Therefore, it is more genuine and inward oriented – it oriented towards the Muslims themselves. This movement first appeared in the Arabian Peninsula, under the leadership of Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahab (1703-1792). The Abd al Wahab movement launched a *jihad* against Muslims who were seen as deviating from the teachings of pure Islam which practiced a lot of *bid'ah*, *keburafat*, superstition, and so on. The Wahabi fundamentalist movement was not only a purification of tawhid, but it is also war of Mecca and Medina, which was followed by the annihilation of historical monuments which they saw as a source of deviate.²⁶

Fundamentalist movements like Wahhabism also emerged in Sumatra, known as the Paderi movement in Minangkabau. The strong opposition of moderate reformers and indigenous peoples was an important factor

driving the radicalization of this reform movement by Tuanku Nan Tuo's students. Among the points of view of the Padrians who look similar to Wahhabism are opposition to *bid'ah*, *keburafat* and the prohibition of the use of tobacco and silk clothing.

Islam fundamentalism movements either directly or indirectly influenced by the Wahabi movement also appeared in several regions, such as in Nigeria, West Africa, and the Indian Continent. However, the power of European colonialism at this time was already on the Islam territory, but it was not a significant factor of the Islam fundamentalism movement.²⁷

The emergence of Islam fundamentalism is caused by two things. **First**, there is an internal factor that wants to do Islam teachings purification which have been mixed with various *bid'ahs* and then returned to pure Islam values. **Second**, there are external factors, especially when Western controls Muslim areas, politically, economically, and socio-culturally. This condition raises the reaction of Muslims against the West, because it is considered as a factor that resulted in Muslims decreasing. Then, this rejection is carried out in the form of resistance to *jihad* and returning to Islam values as an antithesis to the ideology of modernity.²⁸

After the fall of the New Order in 1998, the change in the system of government brought a great influence to the development of various elements of the nation, including Islam development. Islam is very diverse in Indonesia. This diversity is reflected in the number of Islam organizations and groups which from time to time increasingly varies.

²⁵Martin Riesebrodt, 'Fundamentalism and the Resurgence of Religion', *Numen*, 47.3 (2000), 266–87.

²⁶Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam* (London: President and Fellows of Harvard, 1994), p. 62.

²⁷Kayhan Delibas, 'Conceptualizing Islamic Movements: The Case of Turkey', *International Political Science Review*, 30.1 (2009), 89–103 <<https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512108097058>>.

²⁸Idhamsyah Eka Putra and Zora A. Sukabdi, 'Can Islamic Fundamentalism Relate to Nonviolent Support? The Role of Certain Conditions in Moderating the Effect of Islamic Fundamentalism on Supporting Acts of Terrorism', *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, 20.4 (2014), 583–89 <<https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000060>>.

Peter G. Riddel divides four Indonesian Islam forces after the collapse of the New Order, namely; *modernist, traditionalist, neo-modernist and Islamist*. Generally, Riddel agrees to the definition of each category but ignores one category from Woodward, *indigenized Islam*. For Riddel, each category has its own characteristics in responding to various crucial issues in the first years after the first election, the collapse of the New Order, namely 1999. These issues included returning to the Jakarta Charter, the Maluku crisis, opening trade relations Israel, the federal state of Indonesia, a place for minorities in the Indonesian state system, women presidents, and political parties was born after the collapse of the New Order²⁹.

Indonesian' economic crisis that occur in 1998 led to protests from various elements. This phenomenon becomes roots of religious radical movements. This is because the government was not able to solve the crises that occur in Indonesia at that time.

Almost all people believe that political reform is only way to recovering the economic crisis. Generally, the aim of political reform is to create *good governance*, a clean and authoritative government. The government not only creates rapid economic growth and material prosperity for its citizens, but also provides dignity and a pride of nation. Thus, it is impossible to increase society pride, if the government is corrupt with all the implications.

The increasing public distrust of the Suharto government has made it more difficult to accept the steps taken by the government. The crisis of trust is also made Seoharto leave the presidency he had occupied for 32 years. The political atmosphere after the cessation of President Soeharto was full of frustrating events among the government, ABRI, political parties and the general public.

Among the events that could be called as political disintegration, for example Habibie become President replacing Suharto, forming a Development Reform Cabinet, the emergence of new political parties, an offer to the East Timorese people for broad autonomy and independence, separatist movements in Irian Jaya and Aceh who want to break away from the Republic of Indonesia, accelerated Election Plans and Presidential Nominations.

This political crisis continued throughout 1999-2000, starting with the implementation of the 1999 General Elections, a multi-party, in which political maneuvers were occurred. Megawati's tackling which was followed by the rise of Gus Dur to become Indonesia's fourth President showed the political struggle at the elite level. This political situation was surging again when Gus Dur was forced to step down from his position as president so that within a relatively short period of time there were three changes of president. This situation illustrates, that the political situation in the country is indeed chaos. This certainly has an impact on the delay in the reform agendas in other fields for immediate implementation.

Simultaneously with the economic and political crisis in Indonesia, a social crisis which worsened the harmony of the nation's life was followed. The various acts of collective violence in the form of riots, looting, and destruction, religious and ethnic conflicts and so on resulted in the disruption of peace of people life. Soeharto's fall from the presidency did not immediately end serious problems facing the Indonesian people.

During the presidency of B.J. Habibie, there was a lot of terrible violence. For example, homicides incident of *dukun* was widespread, from Banyuwangi, to Tapal Kuda area in East Java to Central Java, and finally in Pangandaran, West Java; the Ketapang

²⁹Peter Riddel, "The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, Vol. 13 (2002), pp. 65-83.

incident, Jakarta, which marched to Kupang and dramatically increased escalations in the form of religious/ethnic warfare in Ambon, Maluku; ethnic war in West Kalimantan Sambas; until the '*gerilya*' war which caused a massive exodus in Aceh. Not surprisingly, some observers saw that the Indonesian was on the edge of collapse, or threatened with national disintegration. In addition, there are also those who see that the Indonesian is stepping towards a social revolution.

Among the mass riots and violence which were fairly large and caused many victims, such as the May 1998 riots in Jakarta, the Ambon riots which began in early 1999, and the riots in West Kalimantan, specifically in Sambas Regency. The May '98 riots in Jakarta damaged many large buildings in the business district. Riots in Ambon involved various groups, Christians confronted Islam and local natives confronted migrants from the Bugis, Buton and Makassar (BBM) groups. Many churches and mosques were damaged or destroyed by fire. The riots in West Kalimantan were a clash between local tribes, such as Dayaks and Malays and immigrant tribes, namely Madura.

There are several conditions that serve as catalysts or accelerate crisis social in Indonesia. **First**, conditions closely related to the economic crisis are frustrated as employee dismissal. It is not only suffers lower-level employees but also middle-level employees. Thus, it can be concluded that the frustration that occur evenly in the society will lead to aggressive behavior. Considering the frustration experienced by the society regarding daily life, especially related to public

services that have been going on for a long time, their frustration is very intense.

Second, due to the economic crisis, many Indonesian people were suddenly unable to meet their basic needs, especially food needs. Here, there is a correlation between acts of violence and food needs.

Third, the social riots of 13 and 14 May 1998 in Jakarta were considered a successful model by the society in solving problems that had dragged on for a long time (modeling effect). **Fourth**, riots cannot be separated from weak law enforcement, which has an impact on the ignorance of the law by the society. The collective violence acts seemed to have been institutionalized through the process of forming a model of violence on May 13 and 1998, were worsen by ABRI's indecisive attitude towards various riots and violations of the law. As a result, in society, permissive attitude is developed in problems solving.

Fifth, the condition of a society that is completely uncertain and there is no reliable source of information, so that they more quickly believing in rumors³⁰.

The New Order is the momentum of freedom of thought and expression of opinion as directed by a number of new organizations of Islam,³¹ but there is a strong suspicion that this still exists in relation to the Paderi movement in terms of thought and movement³². It means that there is a desire to repeat the movement of the Paderi now.

The presence of a number of new organizations of Islam carries special characteristics that are different from existing mass organizations of Islam, such as in terms of their appearance wearing white *koko* clothes

³⁰ Afif Muhammad, *Agama Dan Konflik Sosial: Studi Pengalaman Indonesia* (Bandung: Penerbit Marja, 2013), pp. 76–78.

³¹ 'New Islam' groups in this context are Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Salafi, Tarbiyah Groups (which later became the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera). Borrowing the term Imdadun

Rahmat, this New Islamic group is called a 'new actor' which has an agenda outside the mainstream of the previous Islamic group. See M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Revivalisme Islam Timur Tengah Ke-Indonesia* (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005), p. x.

³² Michael Laffan, *The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalisme and the Narration of a Sufi Past* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), p. 44.

fitted with black pants over their ankles, wearing turbans or caps, and maintaining beards³³; and from the strategy of channeling demands such as the enactment of Islam law, establishing the Islam *Khilafah* and the prohibition of evil acts. They are not uncommon to carry out violence acts; even sometimes they do not know the compromise. It seems that the use of violence has become a characteristic of this group movement, so they are difficult to be separated from the term radical, militant, or even extreme³⁴.

Observing radical Islamic movements in West Sumatra, seen in the phenomenon that emerged lately, such as appearing *Hizbut-Tabrir*, *Salafi*, Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Komite Penegak Syariat Islam in West Sumatra to develop the ideology of religious extremism.

This fact is enough to reinforce that Islamic radicalism began to rise in West Sumatra, can occur anywhere and by any religion, it's just different levels and forms. The radicalism is not really a problem, as long as it is only at the level of thought (ideology) of its adherents. But when the radicalism of thought shifts to radical movements it cause problems, especially when their goals are hampered by the existence power.

In such a situation, the radicalism tends to be accompanied by violence, thus, this phenomenon has the potential to cause open conflict or even violence between the two groups that confront³⁵. Open conflict that resulted in bloodshed from each party.

Radical Islamic Organization in West Sumatra

The growth of Fundamentalist Islam groups has the potential for the roots of radical groups in West Sumatra and it cannot be separated from the long history of the

upheaval of indigenous groups and the Paderi. The conflict that occurred between indigenous groups and religious groups in West Sumatra had changed the religious patterns of the people of West Sumatra as a whole at that time.

The Paderi Movement was categorized as one of the pioneers of the emergence of religious fundamentalism movements in West Sumatra. It would become new root for religious fundamentalism movements in the form of new religious social movements such as the emergence of FPI, MMI, Campus Da'wah Institutions and Committees Enforcement of Islam Value.

Since the fall of the New Order government, FPI and MMI organizations in West Sumatra are increasingly develop. FPI is part of Islam fundamentalism and it is also a social phenomenon. It is a group of Islam social religious organizations in Indonesia. The textual and the radical way of FPI members often cause anxiety, especially in applying the *amar ma'ruf nabi munkar*. Radical actions carried out by FPI have caused fear, tyranny, intolerance and even violations of human rights (HAM) for some cases in society.

The *amar ma'ruf nabi mungkar* is famous slogan of FPI that raises new problems among Indonesian society in general and West Sumatra society in particular. In applying the concept of *amar ma'ruf nabiyi mungkar* FPI group use various acts even violence acts.

Basically, it is a movement that does meet the requirements to be a social movement, because all institutions that lead to social movements are already owned by FPI. According to Herbert Blumer, a social movement is a collective courage to form a new order of life³⁶.

³³ Jeffrey Hadler, *Sengketa Tiada Putus: Matriarkat, Reformisme Islam, Dan Kolonialisme Di Minangkabau* (Jakarta: Freedom Institute, 2008), p. 35.

³⁴ Jamhari & Jajang Jahroni, *Gerakan Salafi Radikal Di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Grafindo Persada, 2004), pp. v-vi.

³⁵ Endang Turmudi, *et al.*, *Islam dan Radikalisme di Indonesia*, h. 4.

³⁶ Herbert Blumer, 'Collective Behaviour', in *Principle Sociology*, ed. by A. M. Lee (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 49.

In this context, FPI is a bold movement that is openly upholding a new order of life, they want to uphold Islam law and establish an Islam *khilafah*. In fact, this movement is always in conflict with the ideology in every country where FPI is developing. Therefore, it is not surprising that at the beginning of the emergence of the FPI movement it always spread underground and always received repression from the authorities during the new order.

On the other hands, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) is quite active in applying *amar makruf nahi mungkar*. The increasingly flow of globalization through neo-liberalism and Western neo-imperialism made Muslims' motivation stronger for jihad. Thus, MMI uses Islam *syariat* as an alternative ideology to free Muslims from a multidimensional crisis.

MMI affirmed its institution as problem solving and took a role in solving various social and political problems through Islamic law. In practice MMI West Sumatra carries four main agendas: first; integrate the thoughts and understandings of Islam activists in one vision and mission based on the Qur'an and Sunnah. Second; form solidarity through internal consolidation in order to form a strong *mujahid* at national, regional and international levels.

Third; establish an institution that is able to overshadow the needs of Islamic activists. Fourth; realize the formation of a community leadership council as a representation of leadership based on *syariat*. Based on the above targets an MMI was born which was an alliance or *tansiq* of the Movement based on the similarity of the Islam *aqidah* and *manhaj* of the struggle.³⁷

The process of radicalization also reached the campus, especially students. It is proven by many radical group members are graduated from university. For example, Pepi Fernando's

network, three of its members are graduates from Jakarta Islam State University (UIN).

The increasing phenomenon of religious activity in a number of universities, especially public universities, is the most potential media for developing an exclusive and radical religious model. Thus, Islam revivalism did not emerge from Islam universities, but from public universities.

In West Sumatra, students are the target of the spread of FPI, MMI, HTI ideology and others, such as Campus Da'wah. It can be said that FPI, MMI, HTI and others are a part of the transnational Movement which fosters radical understanding among college students.

Many students who are members of the Islam radical Movement in West Sumatra, it indicates that West Sumatra is potential ground for the growth of the Islam Radical Movement. The spread of Radical Islam among the universities began from the campus *da'wah*. Then, this study group joins extra-campus institutions such as the Campus *da'wah* Institute. It then collaborates with Islam Radical mass organizations such as: FPI, MMI, HTI and others.

Campus *Da'wah* Institutions in several West Sumatra Universities have a strong and neat network. Even many Campus *Da'wah* Institutions in West Sumatra have pledged themselves into the FPI, MMI, and HTI. As stated by Buya Busyra; that FPI has entered West Sumatra universities under FPI.

The *Syariah* Islam Enforcement Committee (KPSI) is also the community groups who are concerned in voicing *amar makruf nahi mungkar*. Recognizing the difficulty of equalizing all Muslims' understanding of Islamic law has led Islamic groups to express their views in a relatively general tone. Since the fall of the Soeharto government, basically they have only called for the need to implement Islam law in all aspects of life. This

³⁷Syawal, (Leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia West Sumatra) *Interview* {11 September 2017}.

was done in various ways, including through the spread of ideas and thoughts, writing and words.

Radical Islamic organizations in West Sumatra can be seen in the scheme below:




Chart 1. Radical Islamic Organization in West Sumatra

Strategies and Media of the Radical Movement in West Sumatra

The strategy of Islam radicalism groups in West Sumatra that used by FPI, MMI in realizing its vision and mission is through the *amar makruf nabi mungkar*, as stated by Busyra (leader of West Sumatra FPI); that the presence of FPI in West Sumatra has been the frontline in eradicating disobedience, as well as the enforcement of Islam law through the philosophy of *amar makruf nabi mungkar*³⁸.

In terms of culture, West Sumatra is an area that is free from various forms of immoral acts. In accordance with the philosophy of *Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah*, is a reflection of people's lives. It means that West Sumatra is classified as religious society who is committed to the teachings of their religion. Therefore, it should have the same view as that philosophy and at the same time be proven by the attitude and behavior of the people.

In order to realize and oversee these values, the FPI, MMI and other radical groups

conduct raids every night on entertainment venues, especially in Padang, Bukittinggi and others. FPI and MMI were very reactive in capturing a young couple who were suspected of committing immoral acts around Jam Gadang, Sianok canyon, around the coast of Padang and the hotels.

In carrying out the *Namar Makruf Nabi Mungkar*, FPI and MMI involve other local mass organizations, such as the Paga Nagari, the Libas and so on. They have similar goals as FPI and MMI. They apply Islamic *Syariah* according to the principle of *Syara` Mangato, Adat Mamakai*. The movement is often accompanied by vigilantism towards immoral individuals or groups.

FPI and MMI also succeeded in encouraging regional governments to support the agenda of *amar makruf nabi mungkar* to make West Sumatra free from immorality. It was proven by the birth of local regulation No. 11/2001 regarding deviant behavior such as gambling, prostitution, drug abuse and others. This local regulation is more dominant symbolic value than the substance.

Another *amar makruf nabi mungkar* movement carried out by FPI and MMI is a rejection of the establishment of the Grand Kartini Hotel in Bukittinggi Siloam Hospital and the church. The construction was terminated in various ways: installing banners, holding demonstrations and urging the city government of Bukittinggi and Padang to stop the construction plan.³⁹

While in politics, FPI, MMI and HTI have the same mission of running a government based on Islamic law or an Islamic state, where the law and the wheels of government are based on Islamic law. Various strategies and media carried out by radical groups can be seen in the scheme below:

³⁸ Busyra, (Leader of Front Pembela Islam/FPI West Sumatra) *Interview* {10 September 2017}.

³⁹Syawal, (Leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia West Sumatra) *Interview* {11 September 2017}.




Chart 2. Strategy and Media of Radical Islamic Organization in West Sumatra

MUI and Radicalism in West Sumatra

The legitimacy of the monopoly on the truth of interpretations of Islam by the MUI has implications for the MUI's confidence to impose views or fatwas and demands for enforcement of those decisions or fatwas through elements of government apparatus, including regional government and law enforcement and the courts. Through this affirmation, the government seemed to be giving a single authorization to MUI the truth claim on the views and *aqidah* of Islam⁴⁰.

Only groups that are approved by the MUI are allowed to exist while those considered deviant may be excluded. As an organization that claims to represent a certain religious community, it is actually common for MUI, as well other religious organizations, to have a unique and exclusive view that is different from the others, even if it is accompanied by accusations against other groups as heretics and infidels. But it should only apply within the group itself without being accompanied by enforcement by the government and law enforcement. And it should be legitimized by the government with the formation of institutions, official

regulations and omission by law enforcement officials for threats and violence.

The MUI's position regarding the monopoly authority of enforcement by government officials is another history development from the previous MUI. In the New Order era, MUI is called as government servants because their views and fatwas were issued in accordance with the government policy. This is related to Suharto's authoritarianism. The policy continued until President B.J. Habibie, because MUI was involved in mobilizing political support for Habibie's presidency⁴¹.

The role of the MUI is now more political than to protect and take care of the people problems. There has been a shift in the role and function of the MUI; it is used as an umbrella for the people rather than for spreading threats and hatred in the midst of a pluralist society. Fatwas issued by MUI have more political tendencies and cause controversies between members of the community and between religious communities.

In this matter, the strengthening of the role of the MUI deserves special attention because it is also parallel with this tendency. What makes MUI stronger than other mass organizations is generally due to the association of the religious institution created by Suharto's New Order dictator and the government. At that time, it is used as an instrument of authoritarian government to support power and conquer the anti-government religious movement, it has enormous facilities. It has branches throughout Indonesia, formally from the district to the provinces and has an informal structure at the sub-district level.

Currently, the existence of the MUI is in an unstable and vulnerable period to be used

⁴⁰Moch. Nur Ichwan, *Ulama, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto* (Koninklijke Brill NV, Lieden: Islamic Law Society, 2005), pp. 56–62.

⁴¹ Ichwan.

by certain political and community which are fundamental and radical in West Sumatra. As the researcher explained before, MUI membership is not through a strict selection and consists of a group of moderate people, but it rather consist of groups that are fundamental and radical such as FPI and MMI. The existence of MUI seemed to legalize violence acts that were carried out by radical mass organizations in West Sumatra. MUI seemed to give permission to radical mass organizations to legalize violence acts.

Higher Education and Radicalism in West Sumatra

The process of radicalization also reached universities, especially among college students. It is proven by capturing members of the Pepi Fernando network, three of them are graduates from the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta.⁴²

Previously, UIN Faculty of Science and Technology student Syarif Hidayatullah was also involved in terrorism that was successfully determinate by the Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror Police Headquarters. This is really surprising because the chancellor of the university is often invited to speech about pluralism and the teachings of Islam. Many analyzes stated that radical network recruitment among students is usually aimed at general tertiary institutions and more specifically students in certain faculties. In other words, most students recruited are from a background of minimal religious knowledge because they are easier to be doctrine.⁴³

Public universities are more easily targeted by the recruitment of radical movements, while Islam universities are

considered more difficult. Undeniably, radical movements are also emerging on Islam universities, and then it can prove two things. First, there has been a change in Islam universities. Second, there has been a metamorphosis of forms and strategies of movement in the internal radical movements.

For the first verification, the conversion from IAIN to UIN opened a huge opportunity for alumni who came from high school/vocational high school to become students of the religious tertiary institution. In the past most of the IAIN student candidates came from madrasas or Islamic boarding school graduates. When they went to college, they found that the lessons taught had already been learned at the pesantren, and they could even be more masterful than the lecturers themselves. Therefore, they prefer to read books on philosophy, social political science and so on.

This condition is completed by the existence of campus policies that do not provide space for students to express critical and creative ideas. Students are crammed with a series of systematic programs that make students not move, boring, bored and can even cause stress. Students' creations and critical ideas are not delivered well, even though they are a generation that needs space to express ideas or critical and creative ideas. When students' criticism and creativity are blocked or deliberately blocked, it is very possible that students look for escapism against radical movements which according to them provide freedom of expression.

LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus/Campus Preaching Institutions) that developed

⁴²Zulfan Taufik, 'The Youth and The Primacy against Religious Radicalism through the Organization of Mahasiswa Ahlith Thariqah Al Mu'tabarah An Nahdliyyah (MATAN) in Indonesia', *TEOSOFI: Jurnal Tasawuf Dan Pemikiran Islam*, 9.1 (2019), 109-30 <<https://doi.org/10.15642/teosofi.2019.9.1.109-130>>.

⁴³Muhammad Najib Azca, 'Yang Muda, Yang Radikal: Refleksi Sosiologis Terhadap Fenomena

Radikalisme Kaum Muda Muslim Di Indonesia Pasca Orde Baru', *Maarif: Arus Pemikiran Islam Dan Sosial*, 8.1 (2013), 14-44; Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, 'Struktur Politik Dan Deradikalisasi Pendidikan Agama Bagi Anak Muda Di Indonesia', *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam*, 2.1 (2015), 153 <<https://doi.org/10.14421/jpi.2013.21.153-171>>.

at Andalas University and several other tertiary institutions, including tertiary religious institutions, include the category of organizations that control various activities and other student organizations while maintaining a radical attitude. The success of the LDK in political constituencies at the student level and inculcating exclusive behaviour in everyday thinking and actions gives a signal that radical Islamic organizations have also controlled the campus.

Also, at the Padang State University developed a religious organization FSI (Forum Studi Islam/Islamic Study Forum). With various characteristics inherent in the organization; especially the closed attitude towards students from different organizations still shows the development and growth of members from year to year.⁴⁴

Not only limited to routine recitation groups in Campus mosques but also contributing to student activities and colouring even mastering the course of Higher Education student programs. They have study groups to help other students complete their studies. They even live and rent a special place for fellow members of the organization.

Radicalism Movement as a Threat

The case of Islam radical movements in West Sumatra are directed at Islam organizations such as FPI and MMI. They are a problem in West Sumatra society. The existence of FPI in West Sumatra is considered as a threat. The rapid growth of FPI mass organizations in West Sumatra indicates that this mass organization is able to win the hearts of some of the people of West Sumatra. However, the existence of FPI in West Sumatra with its religious ideology makes FPI mass organizations a threat to religion in West Sumatra.

Textual practice and understanding of religion that occurs in Islam groups threatens the diversity that has developed in Indonesia. The narrow interpretation of Islam, which led to the implementation of the Shari'ah in the midst of a pluralistic society, was a real threat to the integrity of Indonesia.

Radical groups of Islam are more likely to carry out anarchist actions when governance and social relations occur that are not in accordance with the ideology of groups and religions. Anarchism and even terrorist acts carried out by radical groups endanger the spirit of pluralism that has been well developed in West Sumatra.

NKRI could be formed because the struggles of the nation are founding fathers early in Indonesian independence. They fight with all their hearts; they sacrifice their lives to be able to realize the unity and integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. So that until now we know many national heroes who have fallen in order to fight for the noble ideals of the nation.

Unfortunately, many young people do not know or do not want to know the struggle of the ancestors of the nation's founders. Therefore, many groups secretly or openly want to replace the basis of the Republic of Indonesia which is the basis for the realization of the unity and integrity of the Republic of Indonesia.

They are affiliated to Islam radical groups. Those who agreed with the replacement of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution joined and made an exclusive group that was wrapped in religion, so that it seemed attractive to ordinary people who did not understand politics. These non-expert people feel that their ideas are accommodated, as marginal or marginalized people, they are equally dissatisfied with the current management of the country.

⁴⁴ Azzuri Illan Tinasar, (Leader of Forum Studi Islam Universitas Negeri Padang), *Interview* {12 September 2017}.

Religion, economy and politics play important role in a country's situation. Understanding the radicalism activities can be categorized as terrorism, if there is a threat, violence and take human rights.

De-radicalization in West Sumatra

1. Multiculturalism Education

Commonly, multiculturalism can be defined as an acknowledgment that a country, or society is diverse and it cannot be denied. It can also be understood, that multiculturalism is a belief in normality and acceptance of diversity⁴⁵. This is the starting point and foundation for the body of a civilized country. Multicultural education becomes very important to understand the differences that exist in society as an effort to eliminate the emergence of social conflict as a result of the lack of understanding of diversity.

When people understand multiculturalism, they will be trapped into the meaning of culture. But there seems to be agreement that to see culture as language, history, beliefs, moral values, geographical origins and everything that is shared and used as a sense of belonging to a particular group. This seems to be what people have in mind when talking about multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism refers to three things, first, it regards to culture, second, it refers to cultural diversity, and third, it regards to specific actions on the response to diversity.

In the context of the country, multiculturalism lose its diversity when in contact with government authorities and identity politics. The government has dominant authority as a regulator of culture. Finally what emerged was monoculture; this is what had happened in Indonesia in the New Order era. With the regional autonomy,

multiculturalism is very strong because it prioritizes local interests and diversity.

Multicultural education is a process of a way of life respecting, sincere, tolerant of the cultural diversity in the plural society. In the context of Indonesia, which is known for being pluralistic, multicultural education is strategic in being able to manage pluralism creatively. In the multiculturalism discourse, multicultural education is based on the concept of the significance of differences that are unique to each person and society. This idea is based on the assumption that every human being has a unique and different identity, history and life experience. Difference is the most important and most authentic identity of every human being than its similarity. Multicultural education presupposes schools and classrooms as simulations of a real life arena that is plural, constantly changing and developing. School and classroom institutions are a vehicle for life with the student as main character while the teacher and all education personnel act as facilitators. Learning is managed as a dialogue and enrichment of a unique life experience, so that it can grow the experience and collective awareness of each citizen and student.

In the learning process it is not intended that students learn as much science or value as possible, but how students experience the process of learning and living in the classroom and school environment. The teacher is not a single actor, who masters and knows everything. Productive teachers are those who can create situations so that students learn by themselves. Classes are arranged not to bury personal identities, but spaces to actualize each other's. Learning activities are not a tool for teacher socialization or indoctrination, but a vehicle for dialogue and learning with students as dialogue partners to create situations that are "science and technology" and social⁴⁶. Thus,

⁴⁵ Azyumardi Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi Dan Modernisasi Menuju Millenium Baru* (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 1999), p. 7.

⁴⁶ Azra, *Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi Dan Modernisasi Menuju Millenium Baru*.

there is synergy between the school as an institution and the environment as supports the existence of the school.

2. De-radicalization of *Pesantren* Education

One factor that has helped to encourage the understanding and actions of radicalism in Indonesia is education. Akbar S. Ahmed concluded that Islam education faced a problem. It is too narrow and encourages the growth of religious chauvinism⁴⁷. One form of religious education in Indonesia that received attention after the occurrence of several religious radical actions is *pesantren*.

Since the disclosure of the Bali bombing perpetrators involving alumni of the Al-Islam Islamic Boarding School students in Lamongan, radicalism has often been linked to religious education in *pesantren*. There is a link between religious education in *pesantren* and radicalism.

The phenomenon of *pesantren* radicalism is actually something strange and it has only recently happened. Islam boarding schools as religious institutions are not actually established as root of the radicalism. The *pesantren* is aimed in producing knowledgeable cadres of ulemas (*tafaqqub fi al-din*⁴⁸). Therefore, *pesantren* teach all things that exist in religion, include monotheism, sharia, and morals.

However, through the diversity of *pesantren* patterns in the archipelago, from *salaf* or traditional *pesantren* (*pesantren* that only teach religious knowledge, especially classical Islam) to *khalaf* or modern boarding schools, which have taught general subjects, the *pesantren* is slowly changing.

Pesantren is no longer an agent of social change with their ability to adapt to local

traditions, but rather do extraordinary purification. In fact, in some cases *pesantren* actually produce a process of doctrinal radicalization. This is what later helped to bury the symptoms of radicalism among *Pesantren*⁴⁹. Therefore, radicalism in Indonesia has always been associated with religious education patterns in *pesantren*, namely the teaching of exclusive and dogmatic religion which has given rise hatred with groups outside it.

Radical actions that occur in Islam are mostly caused by the Muslim's interpretation of the scriptures and the Sunnah of the Prophet which are textual, scriptural, and rigid. The Qur'an and Sunnah are not interpreted contextually which involves the historicity of the text and its contextual dimensions. The verses that tend to lead to violence acts, such as infidels / *kufr*, *shirk*, and *jihad*, are often interpreted as they are, regardless of their sociological and historical context.

What might be implied behind its textual meaning is almost neglected, if not forgotten. In extreme examples, this tendency has temporarily prevented Muslims from being able to clearly understand the messages of the Qur'an as a divine instrument that provides guidance on true moral and ethical values for human life⁵⁰.

Islam radicalism in West Sumatra *pesantren* is not impossible, even if there has been a transformation of traditional *pesantren* into modern *pesantren*. The education system, the quality of the teaching staff, curriculum and literature teaching materials from one *pesantren* to another varies. Teachers have a strong influence in relation to excessive respect for teachers. The teacher is seen as living literature, reading sources and places to ask questions that

⁴⁷Akbar S. Ahmed, *Islam Sebagai Tertuduh* (Bandung: Arasy Mizan, 2004), p. 244.

⁴⁸Abdurrahman Wahid, "Pondok Pesantren Masa Depan", *Dalam Marzūki Wahid, Dkk. (Ed.), Pesantren Masa Depan*, (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999), p. 16.

⁴⁹Zainuddin Fananie, et.al., *Radikalisme Keagamaan Dan Perubahan Sosial* (Surakarta: Muhammadiyah University Press, 2002), p. 15.

⁵⁰Bahtiar Effendy, 'Agama Dan Politik: Mencari Keterkaitan Yang Memungkinkan Antara Doktrin Dan Kenyataan Empirik', in *Islam Dan Politik Era Orde Baru*, ed. by M. Dien Syamsuddin (Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2001), p. xvii.

must be followed. The teacher has the authority to give *sharib*, *tafsie* or meaning to us - teaching materials in the *pesantren*.

In addition, the experiences of the struggle for social and political life of *pesantren* leaders are also very diverse. Each *pesantren* leader has different social, political and cultural experiences. They had a pleasant, bitter experience. Then it influence the orientation and vision of leading *pesantren* to become supporters of the Radical Islamic Movement. This can also be proven in several *pesantren* in West Sumatra.

3. *Da'wah* and Religious Understanding

The term of *da'wah*, can be defined as inviting *mad'u* to believe and worship God, and it means to make people aware of the life reality that they must face and to bring more advanced, prosperous, happy, peaceful, prosperous and Islam conditions to a society based on the guidance of Allah and His Messenger.

However, the problem is how the process of *da'wah* done properly. So, the doctrine of *amar makruf nabi munkar* is not used by Muslims to justify intolerant behavior and even the violence acts against others. In QS. Ali Imron; 104; "*and let there be among you a group of people who cry out to kindness, command to ma'ruf and prevent to munkar, they are the lucky ones*". If the verse is understood literally it will foster an intolerance attitude which leads to the violence act⁵¹.

Term of *amar makruf* is an order to do all things that are good according to the Islam law; meanwhile, *nabi munkar* is to prevent every crime that is considered inappropriate by Islam law. The scope of its application is very broad and covers all aspects of human life. Therefore, there is a need for collective work from all elements of the Muslim community to carry it out.

Thus, in *da'wah* it is better to avoid the practice of justifying any ways to achieve the noble goals, because it have entered the people's privacy, so as not to disturb the dignity and universal values of Human Rights (HAM) which has been given by God. Thus, to find the relevant format in *da'wah*, there are several things that need to be followed;

First, the redefinition of the concept of *da'wah*, the concept of *da'wah* should be changed in its understanding; *da'wah* should not be in conflict with the main task of preaching as *rahmatan lil alamin*, namely upholding the dignity and reinterpretation of FPI Movement for the human dignity.

Understanding *da'wah* is interpreted as an attempt to put people / groups of people who are already religious, must be excluded because it is not in accordance with human dignity. In fact, this kind of *da'wah* can be said as a mission that is contrary to the main duty of religions that uphold the human.

Second, in achieving the goal of *da'wah* (*amar makruf nabi munkar*), it should be done by prioritizing the wise and gentle method through the steps: taking with wisdom, giving *mauidzah hasanah* (good advice), and discuss in the best way (Qs. An-Nahl: 125).

Whereas in carrying out *nabi munkar*, FPI should prioritize a firm attitude through the steps: using force / power when able and using oral and written, if both steps are not able to be done then *nabi munkar* is done using the heart, which is stated to do not approve of all forms of immoral acts.

Moreover, *da'wah* should not be pursued with a defensive approach (much emphasizing the *nabi munkar*), but by promoting an offensive approach (much emphasizing *amar ma'ruf*) which is the common way used by prophets and friends who successfully built

⁵¹ Ilyas Supena, *Filsafat Ilmu Dakwah Perspektif Filsafat Ilmu Sosial* (Semarang: Abshor, 2007), p. 145.

and fostered Islam culture during the heyday of the Islam world⁵².

A more humanist approach is needed, in order to create an anti-violence movement, by actively striving to spread peace for the sake of upholding human rights. Living in peace is a basic human need (human basic needs) which is the most urgent human rights amid nationality.

Third, *da'wah* activities should more emphasis on the substantial side than prioritizing religious symbols⁵³ through prioritizing the system of "Islam values". There is no need to prioritize "Islam symbols and jargon" in *da'wah*. The symbols are only expressions that are not understood and sometimes the substance is not understood by many people. Unlike the way of *da'wah* that does not use symbols as a sign of one's Islam, but uses a system of "Islam values"⁵⁴.

4. Revitalizing Local Wisdom

Recently, the fading of the local identity is considered as one of the factors triggering the radicalism. It causes a void of values, so the radicalism begins to fill the void. Nowadays, the local culture of our own country has change a lot, which gives more space for radicalism to emerge.

Today's modern society has forgotten a lot of the values and local wisdom inherited from our predecessors, many *petatah petitih* Minangkabau which can be a reference in developing the nation's character. For example, self-introspection stays away from contention and stay away from bad traits.

It is important to consider that the local wisdom of Minang culture contains truth values, good values, and the values that can enrich a sense of justice, ability to be

responsible, independence, and harmony. These values are indeed extracted from the potential of local Minangkabau culture, but they are universal, so they can be used as general values and can be used by anyone, anywhere and anytime.

The rise of radicalism in Indonesia, especially in West Sumatra is considered increasing, even in the red zone or really needs to be taken. Concrete efforts need to be made, one of which is to revitalize local wisdom so that the roots of radicalism and terrorism do not strike the younger generation. Every year the Youth Oath is commemorated, but we also need to take an oath to fade the influence of radicalism and terrorism.

In the concept of local wisdom in counteracting radicalism, there are several steps we can take: first, it is important to revive community institutions and even rituals that are local and have strong cultural roots in the community.

This step is used to strengthening the shared cultural cords as well as reviving social capital in society, namely the growth of mutual trust in society and social mechanisms that give sanction for people who violate these traditions. Thus, the traditions that live in a community have strong control over changes that come from outside. That is something that externally controls tradition and even eliminates it.

In its character in Indonesia, local traditions and rituals always contain a high tolerance for other understandings including new ideas and understandings that come from outside, thus the society is always be open. The steps of de-radicalization can be seen from the scheme below:

⁵²Ali Yafie, *Teologi Sosial Telaah Kritis Persoalan Agama Dan Kemanusiaan*, (Yogyakarta: LKPSM, 1997), p. 88.

⁵³Cliford Geertz, *Abangan, Santri, Priyayi Dalam Masyarakat Jawa, Terjemahan Aswab Mahasin*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 1983), p. 276.

⁵⁴ Nazar Nurdin, 'Perda Syari'at Dan Ketertiban Sosial: Sebuah Perbandingan, Dalam Islam Politik Di Pangung Kuasa,' *Jurnal Justisia*, 38 (2012), 78 (p. 78).



Chart 3. Steps of De-radicalization

Conclusion

Based on the discussion above, it can be concluded that: *First*; that radicalism can occur in all religions, but so far Muslims are known as radicals. We must always be alert to the invitations of jihad which are interpreted as war, better life, invitations that require the use of the veil. The way of members' recruitment is to approach groups or organizations that are of the same ideology and are economically weak and have a lack of religious education, they search people in militant villages and tell stories of struggle and lure *jihad*.

Second, that the diversity of the West Sumatra indicates the roots of groups that develop radical attitudes in implementing and responding to various conditions that occur. Among these groups are FPI, MMI, and KPSI. Interestingly, the attitudes and behavior of the radical Islamic Radicalism groups in West Sumatra received a positive response and received support from the MUI West Sumatra. Furthermore, in several universities, especially in general universities, radical attitudes were also shown by a number of student organizations, such as LDK and FSI.

Third, a number of strategies undertaken in the efforts to *jihad* become the focus of radical groups, namely: the movement to implement Islam law with *amar makruf nahi mungkar*, uphold the *Khalifah Islamiyah* framed in the slogan *hijrah* and *jihad*. It is often done

through violence, vigilantism and violating rules of state.

Fourth, in the context of counteracting Islam radicalism in West Sumatra and in Indonesia, guidance is needed; especially the Education De-radicalization Movement at every level, including universities, optimizing *da'wah* and understanding of society and reviving local wisdom as an efforts of propaganda anti-radical.

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